As the mine is still sealed down and as further light may be thrown on the cause and circumstances attending the fire and explosion at Bellbird Colliery at 8:30 on the afternoon of the 5th August, 1923, it is desirable to give only a brief outline of the evidence given at the inquest held on the bodies of the fifteen victims which were recovered from the mine on the 1st September, 1923—the day of the disaster. The accident resulted in the death of twenty-one persons.

The chief point which is revealed by the evidence is that, during the afternoon of the 5th August, 1923, when the main haulage road was being driven down to the No. 5 East level, there was an explosion of gas, followed by an explosion of coal, which destroyed the entire working and nearly emptied the mine of all the men and machinery in it. The explosion was not caused by any negligence or carelessness on the part of the miners or workmen, but was due to an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence which could not have been prevented or anticipated.

The evidence shows that the coal at Bellbird is a high volatile bituminous coal, which is known to be prone to spontaneous combustion. The coal was being worked in a seam that was 8 feet to 10 feet thick, and the roof was supported by wooden props, which were liable to catch fire and cause an explosion.

The mine was being worked at night, and the ventilation system was not adequate to carry away the gas and smoke. The dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, and when the explosion occurred, the result was a disastrous explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The inquest was held on the 1st September, 1923, and the jury returned a verdict of death by spontaneous combustion of the coal, with the further finding that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order.

The mine was later reopened, and an investigation was made into the cause of the disaster. The investigation revealed that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The investigation also revealed that the mine was not properly ventilated, and that the dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, which resulted in an explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the coal at Bellbird is a high volatile bituminous coal, which is known to be prone to spontaneous combustion. The coal was being worked in a seam that was 8 feet to 10 feet thick, and the roof was supported by wooden props, which were liable to catch fire and cause an explosion.

The mine was being worked at night, and the ventilation system was not adequate to carry away the gas and smoke. The dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, and when the explosion occurred, the result was a disastrous explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The investigation also revealed that the mine was not properly ventilated, and that the dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, which resulted in an explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the coal at Bellbird is a high volatile bituminous coal, which is known to be prone to spontaneous combustion. The coal was being worked in a seam that was 8 feet to 10 feet thick, and the roof was supported by wooden props, which were liable to catch fire and cause an explosion.

The mine was being worked at night, and the ventilation system was not adequate to carry away the gas and smoke. The dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, and when the explosion occurred, the result was a disastrous explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The investigation also revealed that the mine was not properly ventilated, and that the dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, which resulted in an explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the coal at Bellbird is a high volatile bituminous coal, which is known to be prone to spontaneous combustion. The coal was being worked in a seam that was 8 feet to 10 feet thick, and the roof was supported by wooden props, which were liable to catch fire and cause an explosion.

The mine was being worked at night, and the ventilation system was not adequate to carry away the gas and smoke. The dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, and when the explosion occurred, the result was a disastrous explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The investigation also revealed that the mine was not properly ventilated, and that the dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, which resulted in an explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the coal at Bellbird is a high volatile bituminous coal, which is known to be prone to spontaneous combustion. The coal was being worked in a seam that was 8 feet to 10 feet thick, and the roof was supported by wooden props, which were liable to catch fire and cause an explosion.

The mine was being worked at night, and the ventilation system was not adequate to carry away the gas and smoke. The dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, and when the explosion occurred, the result was a disastrous explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.

The evidence also shows that the mine was not properly equipped with fire-fighting apparatus, and that the machinery was not in proper working order. The mine was not properly supervised, and there was a lack of communication between the various departments of the mine.

The investigation also revealed that the mine was not properly ventilated, and that the dust and gas were allowed to accumulate, which resulted in an explosion that killed all but a few of the miners.
to the surface. The explosion had closed the door leading into No. 4 West. Noble and Wilson, who had failed to get on to No. 6 West Main Heading, returned to the travelling road at No. 4 West. They found the door closed, and they shut it again after they had passed through. After resting awhile they found the air on the travelling road was clearing below No. 6 West. Noble found the main haulage tunnel at No. 8 East, but the smoke was too thick, and they returned back to No. 6 West, and went a short distance along No. 6 West main heading, but had to return to the travelling road, as they were both feeling the effects of the fumes. They were making their way to the surface. A whistler named McCusky appears to have joined Noble and Tennant about this time, and together they proceeded down the travelling road. When they got a little below No. 6 West they discovered four bodies lying one behind the other in a hole they had made to get behind the rib and facing outward. It was then arranged that Tennant should go to the surface for assistance to remove the bodies. He did so. Noble and McCusky then went to No. 8 West. When they reached 8 West McCusky would go no further, and returned to where they had found the bodies. Noble continued on. He saw no smoke or fumes about, but three horses—they were all dead. He went on to the "bridge" and tried to go up the jip over the fault, but met fumes there, and could not go any further. He returned to the "bridge," and took off his hat, coat, and shirt, and put them on a skip. He then travelled up the main haulage tunnel to No. 9 East and found he had come on a big fire burning in the first cut-through beyond the overcast leading to the trapper's door on No. 8 East left back heading. A strong current of air was passing over the fire, carrying the smoke and fumes away. A skip, which had been sided over against the right-hand rib of No. 8 East, main heading opposite the travelling road to near No. 2 West, where he was found by rescuers, and assisted to the surface.

Whilst Noble was wandering somewhat aimlessly about the mine, others were recovering the bodies. In all 15 bodies were recovered and taken to the surface, but, unfortunately, one of the rescuers, Mr. J. B. Brown, manager of Aberdare Colliery, was overcome by the fumes and had to be left in the mine. Two others, whom Mr. Brown, formed the rescue party, viz., Mr. Marshall, manager, Aberdare Central Colliery, and Mr. Hughes, a miner at Belhbiril Colliers', although in a bad way, managed with assistance to get safely out of the mine.

This sad death would have been prevented had Mr. Brown and party strictly adhered to the arrangements arrived at after consultation with Mr. Jos. Jeffries and party before they entered the mine. This fact goes to show the absolute necessity of strict discipline in operations of this character.

Mr. Jeffries' party consisted of Mr. Jos. Jeffries, superintendent, Abercynon Collieries, Mr. Matherson, manager Belbhiril Colliery, Mr. Gallagher, a miner at Belbhiril Colliery, and Mr. Lewis, Inspector of Collieries, had arranged with Mr. Brown that they would go down with the second stretcher party (Mr. Brown going with the first stretcher party to recover the nine bodies at No. 9 West) and check No. 9 West, where the bodies lay. It is distinctly stated that if the latter party had not gone to the surface for assistance to remove the bodies, it would have been impossible to find them on the surface. The four tunnels were sealed first, and then the upcast shaft, the whole operation of the sealing being completed on the evening of the following day. Three or four explosions occurred while sealing operations were in progress. One of such explosions wrecked the brickwork of the upcast shaft and put the fan out of action.

Such is a brief outline taken from the evidence of what occurred at the colliery shortly after the accident became known.

It will be seen there was no organised attempt at rescue immediately after the disaster, when there is such an important factor, and when there is a possibility of saving life. The under manager, after seeing the position for himself, instead of warning the pit, should have returned at once to the surface (especially when he knew that the manager was unfortunately absent from the colliery), and get on to No. 6 West main heading. In a weakened state they made their way along No. 6 West main heading to the stone drive through the fault leading to the new tunnel. They were met in the stone drive by rescuers, and assisted to the surface and then to the office.

After resting a while, Mr. Jeffries made a statement to the various superintendents and managers of the Mainland-Ocean Collieries, who had assembled in the office, together with Senior Inspector Hutton and Inspector Lewis, as to the internal condition of the mine. A consultation followed—everyone present expressing the opinion that to try and recover the bodies still in the mine would involve a serious risk and might result in further loss of life. A unanimous decision was then arrived at to seal the mine down. However, before any action was taken, three representatives of the local Miners' Lodge were called in, and with the aid of the Colliery plan the position was explained to them. Each of them concurred in the decision to seal the mine down.

The four tunnels were sealed first, and then the upcast shaft, the whole operation of the sealing being completed on the evening of the following day. Three or four explosions occurred while sealing operations were in progress. One of such explosions wrecked the brickwork of the upcast shaft and put the fan out of action.

There was evidence in some instances that the coal roof fell well before the "tips" were worked, and that in some cases the whole of the coal thus fallen had not been filled away, but there was no evidence of heating or spontaneous combustion ever having occurred in the mine, except that a miner named Powell stated that a fortnight before the strike or lockout (about the end of March, 1923) while he was filling at a fall of top coal in No. 5 East some of the coal was hot, but this was filled away. He said he came to cool coal again to the north, and might result in further loss of life. A unanimous decision was then arrived at to seal the mine down. However, before any action was taken, three representatives of the local Miners' Lodge were called in, and with the aid of the Colliery plan the position was explained to them. Each of them concurred in the decision to seal the mine down.

The four tunnels were sealed first, and then the upcast shaft, the whole operation of the sealing being completed on the evening of the following day. Three or four explosions occurred while sealing operations were in progress. One of such explosions wrecked the brickwork of the upcast shaft and put the fan out of action.

There was evidence in some instances that the coal roof fell well before the "tips" were worked, and that in some cases the whole of the coal thus fallen had not been filled away, but there was no evidence of heating or spontaneous combustion ever having occurred in the mine, except that a miner named Powell stated that a ...
In the total absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am of opinion that the fire was in the first cut-through on left of No. 8 East, where it was seen by Mr. Noble, and that it was caused probably by a naked light in some way. All the workmen used naked lights, and as some passed through the door in No. 8 East and others along No. 8 East heading, it is just possible for a fire to have been started from one of their lights.

There was also evidence that workmen travelled out through what might be termed old workings from No. 8 to No. 5 East. Such places may not have been examined within the prescribed time. This showed lax discipline, and should not be allowed.

The question of lighting was brought up, and the evidence was to the effect that naked lights should be prohibited on the Maitland-Coonamble field. Mr. Jeffreys, superintendent of Aberthaw-Seaham Collieries, advocated a protected light, and was opposed to safety-lamps in some of the mines if General Rules 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 had to apply. It is hard to understand how the carrying of matches, smoking, and indiscriminate shot-firing could be controlled if safety-lamp conditions are not to apply.

Mr. McKensey, superintendent, Hebburn Limited, stated that in his opinion, safety-lamps should be installed in all mines.

Mr. Kirk, manager, Aberdare Extended Colliery, was also of opinion that naked lights should be taken out of the mines on the Maitland field.

The evidence was also in favour of stone-dusting being made compulsory in all dry and dusty mines.

The evidence also favoured men being set apart specially for the examination of old and waste workings; that they should hold a Third Class or Deputy's Certificate; and that such examinations should be made on the day shift.

A good deal of evidence was given about rescue work and rescue apparatus. There was a difference of opinion as to whether such apparatus would have been of service in the early stages of rescue operations. The managers who gave evidence preferred to take the fresh air in with them as against using the apparatus. No one was opposed to its use under certain circumstances with thoroughly trained men, properly equipped under proper supervision, and where the rescue operations were properly organised. Even then some doubted if they would be as effectual in saving life as the general public anticipated. All were in favour of a central rescue station being established.

**Verdict of Jury.**

That the said deceased, fifteen in number, hereinafore mentioned, met their deaths in the Bellbird Coal Company's (Limited) Colliery at Bellbird on the 1st day of September, 1923, from carbon monoxide poisoning, caused through a fire or an explosion in the said colliery, but there is no evidence to show how such fire or explosion was caused.

**The Riders.**

1. The evidence adduced at this inquest does not prove how the disaster on the 1st September, 1923, in the Bellbird Colliery, originated; and, therefore, the jury recommends:—That gentlemen of mining experience be appointed and vested with the powers of a Royal Commission to ascertain the real cause thereof.

2. The great weight of evidence at this inquest shows that the Bellbird Colliery was a safe one; but the jury believes that similar accidents are likely to recur in any of the South Maitland collieries; and in view of the increasing numbers, recommends:—That a central rescue station, with a trained staff, be forthwith established, equipped with the most modern appliances known, for the saving of life in such disasters.

3. The jury believes that the Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1901 and 1903 is obsolete, inasmuch as that Act does not enforce sufficient precautionary measures for the protection of underground employees engaged in collieries, and therefore should be amended to provide for that degree of safety which the past fifteen years' experience in the art of mining has shown to be necessary.

**Table U.—Particulars of Accidents, 1923.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character and Cause</th>
<th>No. of Fatal Accidents</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
<th>No. of Non-Fatal Accidents</th>
<th>No. of Persons Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falls of roof and side:—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the working face</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On roads while repairing or enlarging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On roads while otherwise working or passing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from falls underground</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives:—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While charging or stemming holes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While boring or working near unexploded remnants left by incomplete detonation of the charge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blows from coal or stone projected by shots, when persons had not taken sufficient shelter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>...</strong></td>
<td><strong>...</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground haulage:—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While engaged in hauling operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While walking in-by or out-by to or from their work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>...</strong></td>
<td><strong>...</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trams and tubs (ran over or crushed by):—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runaway trams and tubs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface railways or tramways:—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While engaged in moving waggons or tubs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While engaged in coupling or uncoupling waggons or tubs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run over while passing along or across railways or tramways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crushed between waggons or tubs and structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other ways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pals of roof and sides.—As compared with 1922, the fatal accidents and deaths under this heading are two more, while the non-fatal accidents are one less.

Explosives.—There were no fatal accidents due to the use of explosives, but the non-fatal accidents from this cause were one more than occurred during 1922; the number of persons injured was also one more. As nearly all the accidents under this head could have been prevented with the exercise of a little more care and judgment, I propose to give a brief description of each accident.

On the 11th January, at the Cromwell Colliery, W. Victor, a miner, aged 33, was working in a bord and a hole had been bored 6 feet deep along the left side. It was charged with 15 lbs. of dynamite. After the shot was fired the men heard a sizzling noise in the hole but continued to work. A second explosion took place and a piece of coal struck Victor on the left ankle, causing a nasty flesh wound.

On the 14th January, at the State Coal Mine, Lithgow, Chris Hall, a miner, charged two holes and retired after lighting the fuses. He heard only one report and thinking that the second shot had not been hit, he returned. Finding the fuse burning he attempted to run back, but was struck by flying coal from the shot and received slight injuries.

On the 16th February, at the Ebbw Vale Colliery, Adamstown, Donald Kerr, an aged 53, was tamping a shot hole in the coal face when the charge exploded and knocked him down. He received abrasions to the face. It was thought that the tamping charge stuck in the hole and Kerr hammering away at it burst through and struck the detonator embedded in the charge.

On the 9th April, at Abermain No. 2 Colliery, Kearley, Thomas Howley, a miner, aged 41, and mate were firing a shot in No. 2 heading, No. 2 West District, and retired to a place of safety. A shot was fired in No. 1 heading and, missing this for their own shot, they returned to the face of their own shot when their own shot went off. The coal from the shot struck Howley on the left leg causing bruises.

On 2nd May, at Ivanhoe Colliery, Piper's Flat, William Gates, a wheeler, aged 10, retired to the first cut-through on the right with the two miners he was wheeling for as a shot was being fired. He was sheltering 3 yards back in the cut-through when a piece of coal was projected by the shot, struck a prop and glanced into his eye, necessitating nine days' rest.

On the 27th June, at the State Coal Mine, Lithgow, two miners, James Reynolds and William Hutchinson, were working in the east boundary heading and had a mis-shot on the afternoon of 26th June. They shot again about 10 minutes after firing a relieving hole on the 27th the mis-shot exploded. Reynolds lost the sight of the left eye and Hutchinson received cuts on the face and chest.

On the 27th June, at the South Teralda Colliery, Passifen, John Walsh, a miner, aged 35, and mate were working in No. 7 bord—his mate at the time of the accident being some distance along the bord. The miners in No. 6 bord had prepared a shot and, as the pillar between the bords was thin, they warned Walsh, who, however, did not take cover. The shot went off and blew through and injuries were sustained by Walsh on the face and arms.

On the 4th August, at the Burwood Colliery, Charlestown, James Fallon, a deputy, aged 56, in the process of charging a shot broke the detonator wires leaving 6 oz. of quinary sniblet in the hole. Another 2 oz. were inserted and a fresh detonator supplied. The shot was lamped and fired by Fallon, who thought the shot did not make the usual report and went in to investigate when the second shot went off, causing injuries to his face and eyes.

Surface Railways and Tunnels.—The accidents under the above heading were 1 fatal and 2 non-fatal in 1922.

Fire-damp and Use of Safety-lamps.

Fire-damp has been reported under the general or special rules during the year at the following collieries:

Northern District.—Aberdare, Aberdare South, Aberdare Central, Abermain No. 2, Brown's (Mimmi), Dudley (Victoria Tunnel and Borehole seams), East Greta, Hebburn, Hebburn No. 2, Lambton B, Richmond Main, Redhead (Victoria Tunnel and Borehole seams), Seaham Nos. 1 and 2, South Greta, Stanford Mervyn, Stockton Borehole, West Wallsend and West Wallsend Extended (Killingworth).

Southern District.—Balmain, Bulli, Coal Cliff, Corrimal-Balgownie, Excelsior No. 2, Metropolitan, Mount Kembla, Mount Pleasant, North Bulli, South Bulli and South Clifton Tunnel.

Western District.—Fire-damp was not reported during the year.

Safety-lamps are used throughout the workings of the following collieries:

Northern District.—Aberdare Extended, Aberdare South, Aberdare Central, Abermain No. 2, Brown's (Mimmi), Dudley (Victoria Tunnel and Borehole seams), Hebburn Nos. 1 and 2, Lambton B, Pelaw Main, Richmond Main, Seaham Nos. 1 and 2, Stanford Mervyn, Stockton Borehole, West Wallsend and West Wallsend Extended (Killingworth).

In addition to the above, they are used in certain parts of the following collieries:—Aberdare, in the east dip split on the south side of pit; Abermain No. 2, in the headings of No. 2 East District, Nos. 1 and 2 South East Districts and No. 1 East District; Brown's (Mimmi) by all persons working in pillar districts.

Southern District.—All the collieries in the Southern District use safety-lamps throughout, except Excelsior No. 1, Mount Kembla Extended, Wongawall and South Kembla. I understand that safety-lamps are used for inspection purposes under General Rule 4 at the latter collieries.

Western District.—Safety-lamps are used for making the examinations required by General Rule 4 at all the larger collieries in the Western District.

Electric safety-lamps for general use by workmen in collieries where safety-lamps are used:—The matter of lighting underground is still engaging the attention of both managers and workmen in the Northern and Southern districts where coal safety-lamps are in use. I am pleased to say from information I have at hand that in practically all the collieries in the latter district in which all safety-lamps are now used, electric safety-lamps will be installed during the next few months.

Electric safety-lamps have also been introduced into several of the Northern collieries during the year, and I understand that at least two other collieries contemplate installing these lamps at an early date.

Mr. C. Fletcher, in his presidential address before the members of the Manchester Geological and Mining Society on the 29th November, 1923, stated, inter alia:

"I am convinced, however, after considerable personal experience and most careful inquiries, that a good electric lamp—with the outer glass frosted—is beneficial in every way; it being understood, of course, that each place or group of places will have in addition at least one flame safety-lamp for gas-testing purposes. Subject to this, I consider that their use tends to greater safety and comfort as well as to an improved output and cleaner filled coal. The outer glass should, however, be frosted. It has been proved conclusively that the obscuring of the glass reduces both the shadows from the lamp pillars and the general glare of the lamp without affecting in any way the visual acuity. Our men now prefer the frosted glass, and, of course, no one who has once had the good reliable electric lamp ever wishes to go back to an oil lamp."

The only part of the above address I question is "that each place or group of places, will have in addition at least one flame safety-lamp for gas-testing purposes. I am opposed to the giving of additional lamps at any time as they are very liable to be left unattended and may under certain circumstances become a menace rather than a safeguard."

These